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I
INTRODUCTION
The treatment of political convicts sentenced to deprivation of freedom in
the socialist countries of eastern Europe has undergone an evolution that can
be fully understood only against the background of the traditional treatment
of political offenders which grew and developed in western and central
Europe (Russia excluded) during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
prior to World War I. This tradition, initiated by the French and American
revolutions and modern penal theories developed by sociologists, led to the
conclusion that political dissenters and nonconformists represent a separate
class of offenders requiring special treatment and attention.' This conviction
was aided by the liberal movements which insisted on the judicial control of
all aspects of the exercise of power, including the prison regimes. In the be-
ginning of the twentieth century prisons were run according to well-defined
codes. Prison administrations were controlled indirectly by the ministries of
justice and directly by the district attorneys who prescribed for periodic visi-
tation and inspection, and delegated direct control to the courts of original
jurisdiction in regard to the execution of judgments. In addition, prison
regimes became more directed toward rehabilitation, leading to abolition of
some types of imprisonments, and segregation of prisoners according to the
chances of rehabilitation, age, and recidivism.
2
It was realized that it would be useless to expose political offenders to the
general prison regimes in this atmosphere. In most western and central Euro-
pean countries, political offenders served their sentences in separate institu-
tions, where the special regime permitted confinement without a duty to wear
prison clothing. Political prisoners had access to libraries, study and writing
facilities, release from compulsory work, and had the right to obtain food
from outside sources. 3 One aspect of the special regime applicable to political
offenders was their relative freedom of correspondence and visiting privi-
leges.4 In that age of political liberalism, it was realized that political offenders
1. See, M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (A. Sheridan trans.
1977) for background on the origins of the prison.
2. Id. at 10-11, 269.
3. M. IGNATIEF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN, at 120-23 (1978).
4. Id.
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often represented forces struggling for a better future government, more lib-
eral and free, or even an outright democratic form of government-that, al-
though in conflict with the powers that be, they were true representatives of
the aspirations of the broad social masses.
II
THE LIBERAL AGE AND SOVIET DISSENT
Before we proceed with the main subject of this article, it is necessary to
note an important difference between the dissenter of the age of liberalism
and the dissenter who is the product of the current conditions prevailing in
the Soviet socialist countries. The pre-World War I dissenter wanted to
change the existing order. He/she was active politically in efforts to replace
the existing form of government or in efforts to win recognition of the rights
of social, national, ethnic, or religious minorities. Today, Soviet dissenters in-
sist on the enforcement of the principles of the existing constitutional order
in the socialist countries, such as freedom of speech, the press, religion;
he/she insists on the right to criticize the actions of the government and its
economic and social policies. The Soviet socialist dissenter is the product of
the unfulfilled promise that the government and power belong to the people.
In contrast with the liberal age dissenter, who desired change, the Soviet dis-
senter desires that relations between government and the people be governed
by the existing law.5
The writings of the leading Soviet dissenters quarrel little with the letter
and spirit of the laws or even with the totalitarian character of the Soviet
state. Of the leading dissenters, only Solzhenitsyn desires modification of
some features of the Soviet economic order: he sees Russia's future in the
emergence of the peasant farming society. Medvedev and Sakharov stress the
need to change both the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union
that are characteristic of the continuing philosophies of the Stalin regime to
assure a freer style of life; important issues are: imperialism, suppression of
freedom, and hostility towards nonsocialist regimes, which, in their view, have
been able to assure a better life for the working man. Acceptance of the So-
viet regime goes so far that dissenters accept and even uphold the leading
role of the Party.6 In effect, their program is modest and can be put into
practice without affecting the basic features of the Soviet order. On the
whole, the dissenters are in conflict not with the institutions but with Soviet
government policies. The quarrel of the socialist regimes in eastern Europe is
5. See, V. CHALIDZE, To DEFEND THESE RIGHTS (G. Daniels trans. 1974); Lecture by Pavel
Litvinov, The Human Rights Movement in the USSR, reprinted in 4 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Spring
1975, at 11-15.
6. See, Sakharov, Medvedev and Turchin, Appeal For a Gradual Democratization in SAMIZDAT:
VOICES OF THE SOVIET OPPOSITION 399-412 (G. Saunders ed., M. Vogt trans, 1974).
[Vol. 43, No. 2
Page 289: Spring 1979]
not so much with the dissenters' struggle for the reforms as with the demand
for the realization of human rights, which are, as a matter of fact, guaranteed
generously in the constitutions of eastern European countries. 7
Some of the attitudes of the eastern European regimes toward the de-
mands and claims of the dissenters may be discerned from the tone of the
eastern European government press (there is no other) in its reports on the
proceedings of the Belgrade conference on the Helsinki Declaration. A Soviet
paper rejected the charge that the Soviet regime pays no respect to the reali-
zation of the principles of the Helsinki Act by stating that, "an honest Soviet
citizen, who does not meddle in the business of government or the Party, has
nothing to fear from the Soviet state,' 8 thus acknowledging the fact that gov-
ernment business is of no concern to the citizen. Only when a distinction is
drawn between the dissenter of the liberal age and the Soviet dissenter may
we understand the rationale of the penal regime applied to the dissenters in
socialist societies.
III
ORGANIZATION OF POLITICAL POLICE
The present eastern European situation still displays the techniques used
in the Soviet Union during the Civil War to exterminate and stamp out politi-
cal movements hostile to the Communist regime established by the revolution.
Its most important feature was the creation of special agencies, which were
given the right to impose penalties without trial for political unorthodoxy and
generally to apply various measures to remove class enemies from Russian so-
ciety. The name of the agency was changed from the Extraordinary Commis-
sion, established in 1917, to the present Committee for State Security. This
agency has always been endowed with broad, undefined powers to arrest, im-
prison, and put to death all who are or could be considered enemies of the
regime. From the beginning it had the right to place any people or social
groups that were a threat to the regime in confinement or in forced labor
camps without trial; the threats ranged from opposition within and from
without the Communist Party to those guilty of ordinary and political crimes
or violations of the social order and juvenile deliquency. The latter category
included entire minority groups such as Baits, Kalmucks, Crimean Tartars,
7. Appeal to World Public Opinion, The London Times, Jan. 13, 1968, at 8, col. 1, reprinted in 4
INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, Spring 1975, at 7-8; Solzhenitsyn, Letter to the Congress of the Writers of the
Soviet Union, Sept. 9, 1967, in 3 SOBRANIE DOKUMENTOV SAMIZDATA A.S. 175 (1975); A.
SOLZHENITSYN, LETTER TO THE SOVIET LEADERS (H. Sternberg trans. 1974), reprinted in IN QUEST
OF JUSTICE 245--50 (A. Brumberg ed. 1974); A. SAKHAROV, PROGRESS, COEXISTENCE AND INTEL-
LECTUAL FREEDOM (N.Y. Times trans. 1968); Medvedev, The Essay of Our Day, in 5 SOBRANIE
DOKUMENTOV SAMIZDATA A.S. 306 (1973).
8. Pravda, July 1, 1972.
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Volga Germans, and Poles found living in the Soviet-occupied territories.9
Some insight into the operation of these agencies may be gleaned from the
order issued by the Extraordinary Commission, which stated, ". . . that the
law gave [it] the . . .power to imprison by an administrative procedure, those
• . .whom any court, even the most severe, would ... acquit."10
The regime, which was introduced in eastern and central Europe,
occupied by Soviet armies as a consequence of the 1945 German defeat, has
survived in its essential form until the present. Its basic feature was the crea-
tion of exceptional police powers, controlling prisons, frontier guards, intelli-
gence and counter-intelligence, and administration of forced labor camps. In
theory, the police force and its various internal and external activities are
controlled by the Ministry of Interior. In fact, ministries of interior are simply
heads of the police organizations; therefore, control and supervision of pris-
ons and penal regimes by the courts and ministries of justice were abolished.
The use of extensive police powers as the main instrument of social con-
trol survived until Stalin's death, when some of the more extravagant forms
of the police terror were removed. While the first move was to restrict powers
of the police in regard to the control of public life of these countries, it took
some time before the police control of the prisons and labor camps was either
removed or substantially restricted.
IV
LEGAL REGIMES OF PENAL INSTITUTIONS
Since the late 1960s, the prison penal regimes of eastern Europe were
based on regular legislation passed by the legislatures. Thus, one of the seri-
ous shortcomings prevailing until a few years ago, regulation of penal regimes by
legislative acts issued by the police authorities, was removed. Bulgaria adopted
a law on the execution of penalties in 1969,11 which was amended in 1974.12
Czechoslovakia adopted a similar law in 1955.13 In Yugoslavia, execution of
penalties is regulated in several laws adopted in the period between 1961 and
1969.14 East Germany adopted a law in 1968 on the execution of penalties
and the resocialization of convicts. 5 In Poland, a code on the execution of
penalties was enacted in 19 6 9 .i6 A law on the execution of punishments went
9. Gsovski, The Soviet Courts: Their Aims and Functioning, in 1 GOVERNMENT, LAW AND COURTS
IN THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE 565 (K. Grzybowski & V. Gsovski eds. 1959).
10. Id. at 568.
11. Bulgarian Law Gazette (1967).
12. Bulgarian Law Gazette (1974).
13. Czechoslovakian Law Gazette (1965); Czechoslovakian Law Gazette (1973).
14. Yugoslavian Law Gazette (1970).
15. 1 GBI. DDR 109 (1968).
16. Polish Law Gazette, No. 13 (1969).
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into force in Rumania in 1969.11 Hungary adopted a law on the execution of
punishments and temporary detention in 1965, which was amended in
1971.18 In the Soviet Union, execution of penalties is regulated, as to its basic
principles, by the federal law on correctional labor1 9 (this being the main
form of punishment). Specific provisions are enacted by the several union re-
publics in codes modeled after the law adopted by the Russian Soviet Federal-
ist Socialist Republic in 1970.20
A vast majority of socialist countries have returned the administration of
prisons to their ministries of justice (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Hungary, and Poland). The rest (Soviet Union, Rumania, and East Germany)
continue to administer their penal institutions by the ministries of the interior,
which are also in charge of police organizations. Usually administration of pe-
nal institutions is under a separate agency, which in addition to various cate-
gories of custodial, administrative, and medical personnel, employ large num-
bers of specialists in re-education and resocialization.2 1
We cannot discuss comprehensively here the regimes in socialist prisons.
Let it suffice that, although on the whole (the exception being Yugoslavia),
there are no distinctions in forms of the penalty of deprivation of freedom, in
effect, the regimes applied to various categories of prisoners differ fundamen-
tally. The classification of prisoners into various groups who serve their terms
of deprivation of freedom under regimes of treatment varying from light to
severe depends on the prisoners' social danger in the Communist countries;
the severity of the regime is determined by the court imposing the penalty. 22
Legislation of the socialist countries assigns routinely the most severe regime
of the deprivation of freedom to those guilty of crimes against the state, theft
of government property, sabotage, subversion, treason, espionage, murder,
armed robbery, and recidivists who have already suffered a penalty of depri-
vation of freedom. In short, dissenters and political offenders are placed in a
category with the most dangerous criminals. They serve their punishment in
special institutions under the most severe regime; their rights in regard to
correspondence, visitors, receiving parcels, and purchasing goods from prison
shops are restricted severely. In the Soviet Union, penal institutions in which
dissenters suffer their punishments are usually found in the remote regions
of the country which have harsh climatic and working conditions.2 3
17. Rumanian Law Gazette (1969).
18. Hungarian Law Gazette (1971).
19. Vedomosti SSSR, no. 29, item 247 (1969) (amended Apr. 26, 1973, Feb. 8, 1977 & Sept.
7, 1977) reprinted in THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM 701 (W. Butler ed. & trans. 1978).
20. Vedomosti RSFSR (1970); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE
USSR 36 (1976).
21. See, e.g., PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE IN THE USSR, supra note 20, at 36-42, 71-80.
22. See, e.g., id. at 45.
23. Id. at 48-53.
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The spouses of long-term convicts have the right to sue for divorce, which
is granted almost routinely, with court decrees (custody of children and dis-
posal of property rights held jointly) generally favoring the suing spouse.2 4
Conviction for a political offense makes it impossible to return to one's occu-
pation, profession, or mode of life, and in most cases, makes it impossible to
return to the previous place of residence. Employment and place of residence
after release are at the discretion of the administrative authorities. In the So-
viet Union especially, the right to settle in cities of the first category, where
opportunities for intellectual work are centered exclusively, requires a permit
from the administrative authority and depends on obtaining employment in
an institution or enterprise run by one of the ministries of the government.
In fact, conviction of a dissenter under one of the extremely vague provisions
of the socialist criminal codes amounts to a permanent banishment of the of-
fender from the environment in which he lived before coming into conflict
with the socialist state.25
Socialist legislation on the execution of prison sentences in eastern Europe
routinely contains high-sounding phraseology regarding the rights of
convicts-for example, Soviet legislation states that "persons serving prison
sentences . . .retain duties and rights of the citizens of the U.S.S.R."26 How-
ever, the law is silent when it comes to specific enumeration of these rights
and their defense. The prisoner has no recourse to courts nor can he/she ask
for legal assistance. The only remedy at his/her disposal is a complaint to the
prison administration.
V
CONCLUSION
The position of the dissenters in the eastern European countries under
the Communist regimes is influenced by the level of consciousness of the gen-
eral public in regard to the value of the legal guarantees of civil rights. In
some countries, broad masses of the population feel a bond with the intellec-
tuals in the professions, literature, the arts, science, and journalism, assuring
them a comparatively high degree of immunity from government repressions.
The current Polish situation is characterized by the fact that intellectuals sup-
port the demands of the workers, who in turn exert pressure on the govern-
ment and the party to defend intellectuals' freedom to speak in their de-
24. See, Vedomosti SSSR, no. 27, item 241 (1968), reprinted in THE SOVIET LEGAL SYSTEM, Su-
pra note 19, at 455.
25. Numerous cases exist evidencing the harsh effects convictions for political crimes have on
the continuation of previous work, mode of life and residence after release. Many of these cases
are documented in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, A CHRONICLE OF CURRENT EVENTS.
26. Supra note 19.
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fense. 27 This fact offers a fragile and uncertain assurance that the regime will
respect the law and common decency. Certainly, the 1968 effort to liberalize
the regime in Czechoslovakia has failed, suppressed by Soviet military inva-
sion.
It seems that there is little hope for a dramatic change with regard to basic
civil rights in the Soviet Union, primarily because the Soviet public has little
understanding of the rights, value, and importance of individual existence.
One may quote many examples that indicate lack of the basic aspects of the
rule of law among the Soviet population or the enormous bureaucracy en-
trenched in the administrative apparatus, economic management of the coun-
try, professional organizations, and educational and cultural institutions. 28 Re-
ports from Soviet courts suggest frequently that judges, prosecutors, and the
general public have little understanding of such notions as presumption of in-
nocence, of the rights of the defendant, of the role of defending attorneys, or
of the principle of objectivity and impartiality, which should control disposal
of political cases. Certainly these examples suggest that neither the Soviet le-
gal community and political leaders of the country nor the public at large are
committed to the idea of legality and due process of law as they are under-
stood in the open societies.2 9
Let me end this article by recounting a case of a literature teacher in a So-
viet high school. The teacher, Gerlina, signed a letter concerning the trial of a
group of dissenters protesting the manner in which they were treated in court
and in the related press reports. Gerlina was called to a meeting of the
teachers trade union and was charged with breaking her moral obligations
with regard to the ideological values that she must convey in teaching her
Russian literature course. She replied that she was concerned with the author-
ity of law in Soviet courts and that her letter, addressed to Soviet higher au-
thorities, simply asked for a review of the case. Her explanation was inter-
rupted by a teacher of mathematics, who questioned whether the enemies of
the Soviet Union must be judged according to law. "Not only they," answered
Gerlina, "but even war criminals must be judged according to it." The mathe-
matics teacher restated his position, "We cannot judge such criminals accord-
ing to justice. They would be declared not guilty." The meeting was almost
unanimous in declaring that Gerlina was unfit to teach in the Soviet school
system.30
27. See, Smolar, The Protest Movement in Poland, 6 INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, March/April 1977, at
8-12.
28. K. GRZYBOWSKI, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION (1972).
29. Economic Crimes in the Soviet Union, 5 J. INT'L COMM. JURISTS 1-48 (1964).
30. 7 SOBRANIE DOKUMENTOV SAMIZDATA A.S. 478 (1973).
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